Category Archives: Business

The 7 Habits of Highly Effective People: Habit 3 >Put First Things First


The 7 Habits of Highly Effective People
By Stephen R. Covey

[The following is a synopsis of The 7 Habits]

HABIT 3: Put First Things First: The MANAGMENT habit.
Management is the thick of thin things. This is about time management. You need to learn to manage yourself you need to gain control of you life by framing it within Habit 2: Have the End in Mind.

2 Dimensions to Management:
Importance and Urgency: you need to create categories of time demand.
Importance ties to Habit 2; you decide what is important, which wall to lean your ladder.
Urgency is what is pressing upon you, i.e. that phone is ringing and is not attached to Habit 2. It wants to be answered and go into management of the wrong things.

Personal management.

You need to focus your priorities, act on your priorities. There are 4 quadrants

Urgent, Important Not urgent, Important
A meeting today It’s important but not urgent,
A business conference it attached to roles and goals
but not urgent.

Urgent, not important Not urgent, not important
It’s urgent but not important Time wasting, pleasant things, Monday Morning
to you. Quarterbacking, television, facebook

The CENTRALITY OF Quadrant 2: Think of one activity that if you did well and consistently, would produce positive results….Think of one thing in your personal life: if I was to spend more time with my key associates, and my loved ones at home, I would make a good contribution. There is only one quadrant that this activity would fit in. It has to be in Quadrant 2. Everyone of the habits is in Quadrant 2 because it is the key to management.

Credo said ‘80% of the results flow for 20% of the activities.” If you neglect prevention Quadrant 1 will dominate and fatigue you. What happens if you deal with Quadrant 2? You will be able to handing Quadrant 1. It will be manageable and workable. Quadrant 4 is totally worthless. Leisure is important; it is in Quadrant 2. Quadrant 3 is valuable for other people.

To work on Quadrant 2: you have to be proactive, you must act upon Quadrant 2. You are made to act and not be acted upon.

Quadrant 2: exercise, reading continual education, being connected to your community.
Habit 1, 2, 3 are about achieving independence.


You need to do the Habits 1, 2, 3 before Habits 4,5,6.

The 7 Habits of Highly Effective People: Habit 2 > Begin with the End In Mind

The 7 Habits of Highly Effective People
By Stephen R. Covey

[The following is a synopsis of The 7 Habits]

HABIT 2: Begin with the End in Mind: You need to try to visualize to end in mind. You need to view the end of your life as a frame of reference. YOU NEED A Personal vision.

[IMAGINE THIS SITUATION]: It’s your own funeral. Imagine a person from your friends, a person from your family, one from your work, and one from a community organization. What would you like to have said about yourself at your funeral? As a friend, a public servant, business person. What would you like to have said about your achievements?

EXERCISE: write the eulogies of each of those speakers. Your definition of success will be defined through the exercise. You need to have a clear understanding of your destination. Decide what your own value system might be. The key to this habit is that you have to write down what your goals might be, you have to internalize what it is you want to achieve.

A mission statement has to be a real commitment, you need to mark it down, you need to write that one down. Write your own creed, principle, mission statement. Why are you here? Tie yourself to your potential and not to your history. This is the leadership habit.

The Leadership and Management Habit connection: the management is the speed, coordination, efficiency, and the bottom-line. Leadership is choosing the right jungle to work in. Leadership is about what is it that we are fundamentally about. Management is organizing the road to success.

The 7 Habits of Highly Effective People: Summary

The 7 Habits of Highly Effective People

By Stephen R. Covey

[The following is a synopsis of The 7 Habits]

People are shaped by the paradigms they accept as irrefutable. Some of those paradigms prevent individuals from achieving their full potential, ex: “I will never be happy” leds to that person never truly being happy. A paradigm shift is therefore necessary to make you more effective as a member of a family, community, and species.

Covey argues that the 7 Habits are a) extremely basic and obvious, b) apply everywhere/universally, c) the ‘true north’ principles of a character ethic that is timeless.

YOU need to internalize the 7 Habits using three methods:
1) Learn it: understand the material contained herein.
2) Teach it: the best way to learn something is to teach it. It will give you a sense of social commitment to the material, and cultivate the habits by helping others. Being a teacher puts you in different role; if you really want to significantly change your/or someone you love’s behavior, give them a new role. Change their position in the social dynamic: make them the teacher as well.
3) Live it: be the change you want to see in yourself & the world.

The way to see your role in the world is to change your paradigm.

[IMAGINE THIS SITUATION]: The subway in New York on a Sunday. It’s a quiet morning. Suddenly, a father with 5 children enters your subway car. The kids are unruly, loud, noisy and uncomfortably for all passengers. The kids are yelling, making a scene. You turn to the father and say; “Sir, I was wondering if you could control your children?” He turns to you slowly and timidly says; “I guess I should….We just got back from the hospital….their mother just died this afternoon, and I guess they don’t know how to handle it. Neither do I.” Your paradigm is changed immediately. Now you want to offer help. Attitudes shift suddenly and yet the external world has not been altered at all…why has this happened? Think about it. Attitude matters.

Self-Determination: It isn’t what happens to us that effects our behavior, it’s how we interpret what has happened to us and our behavior; we can get a different paradigm in our thinking: we are capable of changing ourselves.

What Is A Habit? It is a principle you internalize, especially if it is a habit of effectiveness. In business, for example, a principle is to value a customer, and you might internalize that principle: it guides you regarding a) knowing what to do, b) the skills used to do it, and c) the attitude to want to do that thing. A habit is the same:

YOU need:
a) the knowledge to know what to do;
b) the skills to know how to do;
c) and the attitude to want to or know why to do. These three elements must converge to become a habit. YOU need to know what to do, have the skill to do it, and the attitude to want to do it.

Dependency, Independency, Interdependency: All of nature and society is interdependent. You need to become interdependent not dependant or independent.

Dependency is the attitude of you: I blame you for failures, it’s your fault that this didn’t work out. It’s everyone else that is responsible for my situation. Society, government, and the economy….

Independence is the attitude of “I” For example, “I” will do it. Independence get what they want through their own effort. I can achieve what I want to achieve, thank you very little.

Interdependency is the attitude of we: We will do it and we can accomplish it. They require their own effort and the help of others. We can only be interdependent after moving from dependency to independency, and finally to the goal of interdependency.

1st, you need to understand the Habits 1, 2, 3: You need to deal with the personality habits of the independent character. You are the personality ethic of your self as long as you are not an iceberg. You don’t want to develop life patterns that are manipulative, seeking quick fix ideas, ways of getting what you want now by whatever self-destructive means necessary. You want to avoid that kind of personality. MORE after the jump.

The First Three Habits deal with moving from dependence to independence:

HABIT 1: Be Proactive

It means you must take responsibility for your own life. Responsibility means: the ability to choose your responses. Effective people are proactive. Their behaviour is the product of their own decisions rather than being a product of their condition. You need a proactive personality.

[IMAGINE THIS SITUATION]: You are planning a picnic with your family, but it become stormy. Proactive people will find a solution by having a picnic in their basement, or using the preparations in an other way. Reactive people say this is stomry weather is so upsetting and that all this planning was a waste of time; negativism will be reactive. When you are proactive you tend not to blame others. You cannot blame your misery on fate. When you become proactive it will have profound consequences.

Covey argues that you can choose to not be miserable. You don’t have to empower the weakness of others who want to control you and make you miserable: take control of your own life.

Being proactive means = wanting to act and not be acted upon. That means being true to your human nature. Determinism/Fatalism says that you cannot control outcomes and are completely subservient to others, your world, and society. Determinism means believing that you respond to choices but your actions are programmed by an external authority/higher power.

Three Types of Determinism:
1) Blame the family: your grandparents did it to you. That’s why your have a short fuse.
2) Psychic detemrinsitm: your parents did it to you. You are always late because your parents are late, and your Mom left you waiting 45 minutes after symphony practice ON repeated occasions.
3) Environmental determinsim: it is your boss that did it to you. That bratty teenage, or it’s the economics, stupid or the national policies.
Reactive people always blame the conditions around them: they say, I can’t do it. It’s my nature. I am not responsible. This is self-fulfilling prophecy< they will produce their results they believe will occur: I can’t be a great ninja so I won’t be a great ninja. They are not in touch with taking responsibility at all.

A proactive person exercises free will. In that way you gain control of your circumstances.

Victor Frankl, the Austrian concentration camp survivor, discovered the last personal vision: the last ultimate freedom, the Nazis could not hurt his mind only his body. He was tortured by was able to gain the highest value when suffering. He was able to be free under the duress of a concentration camp. Remember you are responsible for your own happiness and effectiveness.

HABIT 2: Begin with the End in Mind:

You need to try to visualize to end in mind. You need to view the end of your life as a frame of reference. YOU NEED A Personal vision.

[IMAGINE THIS SITUATION]: It’s your own funeral. Imagine a person from your friends, a person from your family, one from your work, and one from a community organization. What would you like to have said about yourself at your funeral? As a friend, a public servant, business person. What would you like to have said about your achievements?

EXERCISE: write the eulogies of each of those speakers. Your definition of success will be defined through the exercise. You need to have a clear understanding of your destination. Decide what your own value system might be. The key to this habit is that you have to write down what your goals might be, you have to internalize what it is you want to achieve.

A mission statement has to be a real commitment, you need to mark it down, you need to write that one down. Write your own creed, principle, mission statement. Why are you here? Tie yourself to your potential and not to your history. This is the leadership habit.

The Leadership and Management Habit connection: the management is the speed, coordination, efficiency, and the bottom-line. Leadership is choosing the right jungle to work in. Leadership is about what is it that we are fundamentally about. Management is organizing the road to success.

 

HABIT 3: Put First Things First: The MANAGEMENT habit.

Management is the thick of thin things. This is about time management. You need to learn to manage yourself you need to gain control of you life by framing it within Habit 2: Have the End in Mind.

2 Dimensions to Management:
Importance and Urgency: you need to create categories of time demand.
Importance ties to Habit 2; you decide what is important, which wall to lean your ladder.
Urgency is what is pressing upon you, i.e. that phone is ringing and is not attached to Habit 2. It wants to be answered and go into management of the wrong things.

Personal management.

You need to focus your priorities, act on your priorities. There are 4 quadrants

Urgent, Important Not urgent, Important

A meeting today It’s important but not urgent,
A business conference it attached to roles and goals
but not urgent.

Urgent, not important Not urgent, not important
It’s urgent but not important Time wasting, pleasant things, Monday Morning
to you. Quarterbacking, television, facebook

The CENTRALITY OF Quadrant 2: Think of one activity that if you did well and consistently, would produce positive results….Think of one thing in your personal life: if I was to spend more time with my key associates, and my loved ones at home, I would make a good contribution. There is only one quadrant that this activity would fit in. It has to be in Quadrant 2. Everyone of the habits is in Quadrant 2 because it is the key to management.

Pareto said ‘80% of the results flow for 20% of the activities.” If you neglect prevention Quadrant 1 will dominate and fatigue you. What happens if you deal with Quadrant 2? You will be able to handle Quadrant 1. It will be manageable and workable. Quadrant 4 is totally worthless. Leisure is important; it is in Quadrant 2. Quadrant 3 is valuable for other people.

To work on Quadrant 2: you have to be proactive, you must act upon Quadrant 2. You are made to act and not be acted upon.

Quadrant 2: exercise, reading continual education, being connected to your community.
Habit 1, 2, 3 are about achieving independence.
You need to do the Habits 1, 2, 3 before Habits 4,5,6.

 

HABIT 4: Think Win/Win:

“Why don’t we agree to communicate and find out what we can agree upon.”
Win/Win is not a cosmetic idea, it is a philosophy designed to look for solutions that allow everyone to win. Is it really possible? Some believe that it idealistic, especially in the competitive business world. BUT what if you try going win, you lose with customers. You lose customers. What if you go for lose, win, you lose your business? The only realistic approach is win/win.

If you let your friend get only what he wants, it’s a win/lose.
Lose, win is being nice and is not a good idea. Nice guys finish last.
Win, win is more rigorous, because you have to be nice but confident, empathic but brave. It is the balance between self-respect and respect for others, which is the fruits of Habits 1, 2, 3.

What if you can’t get Win/Win?:
The alternative is Win, Win or No deal. If there is no deal you will stop manipulating. If we can’t work out a win, win deal then we must go for no deal. I/You don’t have to manipulate you, no point going into no deal situation.

There is enough to go around for everyone: that’s the abundance mentality (optimism) as opposed to the scarcity mentality (pessimism) i.e. lose, win or win, lose.

So it’s Win/Win
OR
No Deal.

Practice over Principles: An analysis of the Ba’ath Party and its comparative influence in Syria and Iraq

There have been two Ba’ath Party regimes in the Middle East during the 20th century. While they are divergent factions of that particular political ideology, one finds in this analysis that the Ba’ath parties of Iraq and Syria hold key similarities that allow for transformation into successful authoritarian regimes. Once in power, the Ba’ath Parties shift, under the leadership of Bakr-Hussein and Asad, from an ideologically driven freedom movement to a fear-driven authoritarian institution. By analyzing the principles of the Ba’ath Party from its conception to its development in both the Syrian and Iraqi cases, one can see that the Ba’ath Party allowed minority factions to position themselves for political domination over other sectarian groups. First, the essay will outline the principles of the Ba’ath Party. Secondly, the essay will analyze the failure of the UAR and its impact on the Ba’ath Party’s direction. Thirdly, the essay will explore the commonalities of militarism and minority dominance between Iraqi and Syrian Ba’athist regimes. Finally, the essay will show that the Ba’ath Party was a means for the creation of uniquely similar authoritarian regimes such as they existed in the time period of 1963-1980 in Syria and Iraq.

The foundation of the Ba’ath movement and subsequent political party begins with the perceived state of affairs in post-World War I, particularly in Syria. The Ba’ath (Resurrection) movement was initially led by Michel ‘Aflaq, an Orthodox Christian and Salah al-Din al-Bitar, a Sunni Muslim; both were Syrians from bourgeois Damascus families (1397, Devlin). Their principles were unity, freedom and later socialism, which shaped Ba’ath political dynamics once it achieved party status. While ‘Aflaq believed that the Ba’ath movement’s central purpose was to educate, Bitar believed that a political organization was necessary “for the ideas of the group to be truly influential” (1398, Devlin). The principles of the Ba’ath Party arise from the socio-economic and political context of the 1920s. An understanding of how the (Sunni/Alawite) leaders of Iraq and Syria would use the Party for their rise to power requires an understanding of the principles that ‘Aflaq and Bitar instituted in the founding congress of the Ba’ath Party, which took place on April 4-6, 1947 and the subsequent merger with the Arab Socialism Party of al-Hawrani in 1953. In addition, to better understand how Ba’athism came to be an empty rhetorical shell for authoritarian manipulation in the two Ba’ath regimes, one must first understand the ideology that it put forth.

A vision of pan-Arabism had been growing in the school systems of Syria and Iraq in the interwar years (1397, Devlin). Pan-Arabism was defined as the call for unity between persons who speak Arabic (154, Pfaff). In the 1920s and 1930s, “Arabism came to be defined by language rather than geography” (1397, Devlin), this altered the conceptualization of political interests beyond regionalism. Moving against the arbitrary states installed by western powers, pan-Arabism was a new way of looking at an old historical fact; the fact of Arab oneness. Ba’athism was the first political ideology with pan-Arabism as the primary goal, and had a “leading role in spreading the doctrine of unity in the 1950s” (1399, Devlin). The founding Ba’athist Michel ‘Aflaq stated in his treaties On the Way of Resurrection:

Our Party is an Arab Party in the sense that no other Party is like it. It does not content itself with the affirmation of the Arab idea but endeavors, in reality, besides its idea, to be the comprehensive Arab Party in all the Arab regions. It tackles the Arab problems as an indivisible whole. It does not treat the regional question, including the question of Syria, except in the light of one Arab nation (al-moharer.net, ‘Aflaq).

This collective Arab spirit was a philosophy that would be used to capture the imaginations of party members and outsiders. Pan-Arabism also meant secularism, which is conducive to religious tolerance that is crucial to the rise of the Ba’ath regimes of Syria and Iraq. Pan-Arabism has a strategic political stance that rejects arbitrary political boundaries and bypasses religious and ethnic differences that manipulate allegiances and serve to divide. Arab unity was the most important goal for the Ba’athist founders and explains the quick move toward creating the UAR in 1958.

Another dominant principle that coincides with pan-Arabism in the Ba’ath (Resurrection) movement, was the vehement opposition to western intervention in the Middle East. Anti-Imperialism necessitates the rejection of externalities and inversely demands Arab nationalism, which became a political force “in the decade prior to World War I, when Arab subjects of the Ottoman Empire began to assert their Arabness in opposition to the Turk[s]” (1396, Devlin). Freedom was the second pillar of the Ba’ath Party; a rejection of foreign rule. According to Adeed Dawisha, “the nationalist generation of the 1950s and 1960s came to believe fervently that the West would deliberately and effectively block the goals of Arab nationalism…” (3, Dawisha) adding that the Western powers were threatened by Arab self-determination. With the political borders established by the mandatory powers in the early 1920s, the elite were not interested in general Arab affaires but establishing their own political fortunes in the territories they were bound within. Anti-Imperialism was a reactionary response to the ruling Arab elite, who gained from being an extension of Western imperialism.

The principle of socialism and social justice for the poor and underprivileged developed after the initial stage of the Party’s formation in 1947. The slogan “unity, freedom and socialism” and “One Arab Nation with an Immortal Mission” begin to appear on Party publications in the mid-1950s. ‘Aflaq and Bitar initially rejected the class struggle as a Ba’ath Party principle. However, the April 4-6, 1947 Ba’ath Party convention attracted the support of impoverished minorities such as the Alawi led by Zaki al-Arsuzi supporters. Again, socialism is pertinent for minority involvement in the Party. In addition, Dr. Wahib al-Ghanim recruited his own followers including a 16 year old from the hill village of Qardaha named Hafiz al-Asad (34, Seale). Ghanim was instrumental in adding the importance of socialism to Ba’ath Party doctrine. Ghanim blamed the ruling elite “for [the] conditions and insisted on the inclusion, in the 1947 Party constitution, of clauses calling for social justice: the limitation of agricultural holdings, worker participation in management, and state ownership of heavy industry, natural resources, and public utilities” (1398, Devlin). While ‘Aflaq focused on nationalism and Arab unity, Ghanim imported an awareness of economic and political power of the notables in Syria, stating that they had to be broken if the Ba’ath’s vision of independence was to be achieved (1399, Devlin). With the adoption of socialism in Ba’athist ideology, the Party easily merged with the Akram al-Hawrani’s Arab Socialist Party in 1953 to become the Arab Socialist Ba’th Party. It is important to note, however that the 1947 constitution remains the basic document, in both Iraq and Syria (3, Kienle).

The constitution of 1947 established the Ba’ath Party’s organizational structure. Local Party organizations were set-up in Arab countries other than Syria, such as Transjordan as early as 1947, in Lebanon in 1949, in Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Yemen in 1952 (3, Kienle). In 1954, Regional Commands were established to “reflect the growing importance of its sections outside Syria” (3, Kienle) with a new higher body called the National Command. The National Command was designed to oversee the entire Ba’ath Party with ‘Aflaq and Bitar in control. Members were elected to the national and regional bodies and amendments to the constitution required a vote (3, Kienle). “Despite further changes over the years, this basic structure has survived…with the notable difference that since 1968, to some extent since 1966, there have been two distinct Ba’ath parties” (4, Kienle), one dominated by Syria and one dominated by Iraq.

There are a number of consequences of the 1958-1961 UAR failure for the development and direction of the Ba’ath Party in Syria and Iraq. The Ba’ath Party of Syria developed slowly, gaining support in the government through the 1950s. On April 17th 1956, the Ba’ath Party announced it would work for the union of Egypt and Syria as a first-step toward Arab unity (1399, Devlin). As part of the Pan-Arabism that the Ba’ath Party espoused, they pushed for Egyptian President Gamel Abdel Nasser to resolve the political squabbling of the increasingly factionalized Syrian officer corps (1399, Devlin). Nasser hesitated, but as a proclaimed Pan-Arabist he was obligated to act or be seen as turning away from his declared vision (181, Palmer). As part of the negotiations, Nasser demanded that all political parties be abolished, accept his Arab Socialist Union. The Ba’ath Party, seeing the beginning of the fulfillment of unity doctrine and the assumption of continued influence within the Nasser regime, dissolved unilaterally without consulting the bulk of the Party.

The United Arab Republic episode was a major turning point in Ba’ath Party trajectory and arguably facilitated the collapse of the Ba’athist pan-Arab vision. Firstly, the 1961 collapse of the UAR and subsequent failure to reconcile differences diminished any hope of a union between Syria, Egypt and other Arab states. Ba’athists essentially achieved the unity aim it desired but that aim was de-legitimized by Nasser’s hegemonic approach. Ironically in 1961, Syria, which harbored the most pan-Arabs, would openly reject the practical application of a founding Ba’ath ideological principle (1400, Devlin). Secondly, Syria’s “succession was a powerful demonstration that the states created after World War I had developed great staying power” (1401, Devlin) and made future aspirations for pan-Arabism somewhat unlikely. Instead, neo-Ba’ath ideology in Syria would, from then on, stipulate that “unity of the Arab states was to follow upon the socialist development of each region” (7, Galvani). This stipulation made Arab unity even more remote.

In addition, the failure to consult the elected party bodies, before ordering the dissolution of the Ba’ath Party, set a precedent that moved the Ba’ath Party from an organization with elected commands to one rigidly dominated by those in head leadership positions within the National and Regional Commands (1399, Devlin). “Deeply resenting the National Command’s autocratic behavior, many of those who opposed such a far-reaching unity scheme remained secretly organized and soon became known as the regionalists” (32, Kienle). In fact, a chief cause of tension between Iraq and Syrian Ba’ath factions in 1958 was ‘Aflaq and Bitar’s decision to dissolve the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party in Syria (31, Kienle). The regionalist faction of Iraq opposed the UAR ideal and a divergence between the two Ba’ath Party factions made union between Iraq and Syria impossible. The primary goal of Bathism; pan-Arabism was effectively dead by the early 1960s.

The Ba’ath Party’s growth was negligible until the aftermath of the UAR, “Ba’athist influence in the military increased the Party’s political clout…the civilian leadership possessed the titles and visibility; the military officers possessed the power (181, Palmer). The Syrian Ba’athists in the military would build an organization of the deepest significance for Syria’s future during the UAR. In 1959, during the first phase of Syrian disapproval of Nasser’s leadership, five Syrian military men with desk jobs in Cairo formed the Ba’ath Military Committee; al-Asad and al-Jadid were the most prominent (33, Kienle). With the break up of the UAR on September 29, 1961, the Military Committee reconstituted the Ba’ath Party (6, Galvani). Al-Jadid and al-Asad were better placed to reform the Party than the civilian Ba’ath leaders, who were greatly discredited by the dissolution of the Party in 1958 and its liquidation into Nasser’s Arab Socialist Union.

The Syrian Military Committee subsequently joined forces with a faction of non-Ba’ath officers and seized power on March 8th, 1963 (6, Galvani). They did this by persuading the Nasserites and independent officers into overthrowing the secessionist government and planned to immediately called for reestablishing unity with Egypt (183, Palmer). Knowing the unity talks would fail, since Nasser blamed the Ba’ath Party for the secession, the Military Committee members purged and exiled their non-Ba’ath associates and brought in civilian Ba’athists into the government. Three years of “an internal coup within the [Syrian] Ba’ath Party ousted the civilian wing of the Party in 1966, placing the military wing of the Party in control of Syria’s affairs” (184, Palmer). On February 23, 1966 the ‘Aflaq-Bitar faction was ousted by force. However, most Iraqi Ba’athists continued to recognize the civilian ‘Aflaq and his colleagues as the legitimate leadership of the political party. As a direct result of their loyalty to the founders, the Iraqi Ba’ath Party offered asylum and the assurance of continued leadership to ‘Aflaq and his Syrian associates. This act further alienated the Iraqi Ba’ath Party from the Syrian faction.


The UAR’s collapse was evidently important because, as a result, military men emerged on the Regional Commands of both Iraq and Syria (1401, Devlin). It is argued that the military’s training in the chain-of-command system gave them the pre-disposition to authoritarian control from the top, leading to the inevitable outcome of Ba’athism’s transformation once a regime formed. The centralization of power in one man holding offices of the Ba’ath Party head was shared in both cases. The Ba’ath parties “haphazard recruiting practices resulted in Ba’athist turning up in field grade officer levels in the Syrian and Iraqi armies by the end of the 1950s” (1402, Devlin). Essentially, the Ba’ath Party slowly became the political ideology of choice for those in the military service in the two cases of Iraq and Syria. The youth were “indoctrinated in political ideology by secondary school teachers in the expanding public school system” (1402, Devlin) and the military was also the avenue for rural minorities in both cases. In Syria, Hafiz al-Asad joined the Ba’ath Party in secondary school and so did many of his contemporaries. As an Alawis minority, al-Asad took advantage of the Ba’ath Party’s openness. Al-Bakr, a minority Sunni Muslim from Takrit, joined the military in Iraq and would later rule that nation-state from 1968 to 1979.

In both nations, the leaders of the Ba’ath Party came from minorities within the autonomy of their respective nations. For minorities, one of the only means of advancement in society was through the military and from the military into the Ba’ath Party with its enticing doctrine of social justice and pan-Arabism. Hafiz al-Asad was attracted to the Ba’ath political association because his interests, as an impoverished and manipulated rural minority, could best be served within it. Meanwhile Syria’s “wealthier Sunnis, by contrast, found military service to be beneath their dignity and concentrated on commerce” (179, Palmer). This helps explain the minority leadership of the Ba’ath Party in both Syria and Iraq. Saddam Hussein, being a minority Sunni Muslim (although not a military officer), took advantage of Ba’athisms secular, pan-Arab doctrine as well. He began his career as a Ba’athist militant in the attempted assassination of Qasim in 1959 (1404, Devlin). Conclusively, the military is the primary means by which minorities gain central roles in the Ba’ath Party and subsequent governments.

In the rise of the Iraqi Ba’ath faction, the Party was reorganized after the November, 1963 regime collapsed. With the Shi’a factions of the Ba’ath Party purged as ‘communists’ between February and November 1963 (286, Palmer), Michel ‘Aflaq in his capacity as Secretary General of the National Command in early 1964, designated Saddam Hussein as the Secretary of the new Iraqi Regional Command and Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr as head of its military branch (34, Kienle). By 1967, the Nasserite regime of Iraq was crumbling under the impact of the June War and on July 17th, 1968, the Ba’athist coup took place. Learning the lessons from the 1963 government, “power would be binding on all members of the Party. Dissident currents, by necessity, would be crushed” (289, Palmer). The Iraqi Party attracted Syrian Party members who were disenfranchised (as mentioned earlier) by the change on February 23, 1966 where the youthful Military Committee of the Syrian Ba’ath Party moved to oust the aging ‘Aflaq and Bitar civilian wing (184, Palmer). The military wing of the Iraqi Ba’ath Party and the new Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) was led by al-Bakr; a Sunni military officer (288, Palmer). In both Syrian and Iraqi cases, the Ba’ath Party military wing played the central role of securing the Ba’ath Party regime. The military wing of the Ba’ath Party initiated both coups. Once the Ba’ath Party had seized power, Bakr and Hussein worked as a coalition to assure permanent Ba’ath control over Iraq, eventually the civilian wing secured full control of the Party through Saddam Hussein’s consolidation in the 1970s.

Both Bakr and Hussein were of the Sunni minority and came for the Takrit region much like Al-Asad’s Latakia Alawite origins. The Ba’ath message of pan-Arabism appealed to many levels of Syrian society, but its “socialist or social justice message was most attractive to those who believe that they were not receiving a fair share of the state’s resources” (1404, Devlin). Hawrani’s Arab Socialist Party merged with the Ba’ath Party in Hama because of “Ba’ath’s appeal to the rural communities, especially the minority communities, stemm[ing] from its non-sectarian pan-Arabism” (5, Galvani). This argument is further advance by the fact that, for minorities in both nations, the military was one of the few means to which opportunities could be realized. With the Ba’athist ideology, which masks the strong communal (Alawite/Sunni) associations under the veil of pan-Arabism, minorities could dominant at the head of the Party. For Hinnebusch, Ba’athism was useful because it provided a facade (15, Hannebusch). “Class and sectarian interests hid its veil until they were sufficiently organized to emerge openly” (279, Crystal), at that point the regime could abandon Ba’athism as a doctrine while retaining its rhetoric.

By 1968, the two Ba’ath Party’s were both in power and competed for influence and support from the regions. For Syrian Ba’ath, the existence of a Ba’ath regime in Baghdad proved to be a major source of instability for Syrian rulers (31, Kienle). To prevent members of its own political system from joining the new Ba’ath movement in Iraq, “the Syrian regime embarked on a propaganda war to deny any Ba’athi legitimacy to its counterpart in Iraq” (31, Kienle). Instead of looking beyond the hurdles of the Syrian/Iraqi differences, the two Ba’ath Parties reveal, conclusively, that their political ideology of a harmonious pan-Arabism would not be permitted to infringe on maintaining their respective regimes. Once the authoritarian regimes were consolidated, the Ba’ath Party principles would be ignored unless the principle was conducive to the leadership intentions. In fact, “Ba’athism play[s] little part in either leader’s Arab policy” (1406, Devlin), leaving only the cocoon of Ba’ath Party rhetoric and propaganda. In both Ba’ath Party regimes, “neither leader has any use for an organization that allows members freely to propose new ideas, criticize policies, or suggest that the leader can make mistakes” (1406, Devlin).

With the Syrian Ba’ath in power under al-Asad in 1970, Ba’athist socialist doctrine was perpetuated from the legacy of Nasser nationalization era. The Ba’ath shifted wealth and power from Syria’s landed and commercial classes and redistributed it to the workers and peasants who supported the regime, particularly Asad’s Latakia Alawite communities (3, Galvani). The nationalization of private industries and land reform under Asad was intended to dash “the economic control of the Syrian traditional classes…[rather] than to end economic ties with the West” (7, Galvani). Anti-imperialism was not a priority of Asad’s; Alawite dominance was. Even “socialism, however, proved to be profoundly inefficient” (214, Palmer) and particularly served to advance the rural peasants who joined the bureaucracy, military, and Party. It was these minorities who had a “vested interest economic interest in keeping the regime in power” (213, Palmer). More emphasis, under Asad, was placed on strengthening the military after the June War of 1967 than on Ba’ath doctrine. In addition, Asad centralized “power in his hands rather than in the hands of a Ba’ath Party dominated Revolutionary Command” (3, Galvani). Asad turned against the Ba’ath Party by promoting a “National Progressive Front including four other political parties” (3, Galvani). Clearly, Asad was compromising Ba’athism to broaden his base of support.

Similar to the Syrian Ba’ath Party, the Iraqi Ba’ath vowed to “establishing a strong base of support among the masses, and toward that end created an array of women’s, youth, peasant, labour, and other mass-based organizations” (289, Palmer) once in power. The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) and the Regional Leadership (RL) played a key role in the legitimizing of the Ba’ath Party but after 1974 “they…played an extremely limited role in the decision-making process” (449, Baram). Efforts were made to follow socialist Ba’ath policy in the agrarian reforms of the early 1970s and in the 1972 nationalization of the Iraqi Oil Company (290, Palmer). Again the rapidly expanding patronage system of the public sector attracted Sunni Muslim support for the Ba’ath Party. The Sunni Muslims’ gained political preponderance through the Ba’ath Party, therefore serving as a means for Sunni dominance against competing minorities. The Ba’ath Party did not operate as a pan-Arab party since, in such an instance, it would include Shi’a and Kurds as well. In 1980, “incorporating Shi’is and a Christian Arab into the highest party and state echelons may be seen as a step towards narrowing the problematic gap between the party’s pan-Arab theory and its practice in Iraq since 1968” (464, Baram), this taking place only when the base of support was threatened (464, Baram).

What becomes patently clear is that the ideology of Ba’athism held little viability once the two Ba’ath regimes were consolidated. The Ba’ath Party was, in effect, an empty shell, whose policies were to be accepted or rejected by those at the top of the authoritarian leadership. The two Ba’ath Party’s are therefore similar in the respect that they both turn into authoritarian regimes that disavow pan-Arabism and later socialism and anti-imperialism at the whim of the leadership. Patronage and intelligence services (Mukhabarat) are shared institutions in the two Ba’ath regimes. They were restructured, once the Ba’ath came into power, by staffing them with loyal Party members, resulting in a very resilient regime institution (282, Crystal). In both cases, the Ba’ath Party is used as part of the mechanisms of neopatrimonialism. The number of Ba’ath Party members by the mid-1980s was 100,000 full members and 400,000 candidates in Syria, 25,000 full members and 1.5 million candidates in Iraq (1406, Devlin) in accordance with the demand of patronage in the authoritarian regimes.

Jill Crystal’s Authoritarianism and Its Adversaries in the Arab World discusses Iraq and Syria. She illustrates that both regimes rule through “a sustained pattern of force and fear: by the infliction of bodily harm and through the immobilizing threat of violence” (267, Crystal). Political legitimacy is garnered through police, incarceration and fear of reprisal for questioning the regime. Regardless of ideology, the Ba’ath Party, in both cases, must operate in a manner that will continue to ensure their leadership’s hegemony. Under the pressure of political forces, both Al-Asad and Hussein act pragmatically to the changing socio-economic and political environment. Despite a doctrine of social justice at the heart of Ba’athism, political violence is also at the centre of the regimes longevity in Syria and Iraq (267, Crystal). Examples range from the travesty of 1982 at Hama to Saddam’s violence against Kurdish uprisings on numerous occasions. For Samir Al-Khalil, author of the Republic of Fear, the (Iraqi) Ba’ath Party merges with “state, and even civil society into a single, great, formless mass” (41, Khalil). “Uncertainty helps create the ambient terror, the immobilizing culture of fear, that depoliticizes” (277, Crystal) requiring a strong military backbone which both regimes share in common.

The political structure of Syria and Iraq follow similar patterns of development in the 1963-1980. While the two Ba’ath Party factions oppose each other vigorously, the same ideological principles facilitated a political take over by militaristic minorities. Interestingly, Ba’athism led to two authoritarian regimes where minorities rule through military means. The events of the UAR led to stronger military wings in Syria and Iraq and the collapse of any hope of the central Party principle of pan-Arabism being fulfilled. Once in power, the three pillars of ‘unity, freedom, socialism’ were no longer relevant to the pragmatic authoritarian dictatorships that the Ba’ath Party facilitated. What this essay shows is that the noble vision of Ba’athism was adulterated by a climate of political authoritarianism.

Word Cited

Aflaq, Michel. The Five Volumes of Michel Aflaq’s “On the War of Resurrection”: Ed. Fi Sabil al Ba’th English translation. http://www.al-moharer.net/moh210/aflaq-quotes210.htm. Last modified 2003
Al-Khalil, Samir. The Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989, 310 pp.
Baram, Amazia. The Ruling Political Elite in Bathi Iraq, 1968-1986: The Changing Features of a Collective Profile. International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Nov., 1989), 447-493.
Crystal, Jill. Authoritarianism and Its Adversaries in the Arab World. World Politics, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Jan., 1994), 262-289.
Dawisha, Adeed. Requiem for Arab Nationalism. The Middle East Quarterly. Winter 2003. Volume X: Number 1.
Devlin, John F. The Baath Party: Rise and Metamorphosis. The American Historical Review, Vol. 96, No. 5 (Dec., 1991), 1396-1407.
Galvani, John. Syria and the Baath Party: MERIP Reports, No. 25 (Feb., 1974), 3-16.
Hinnebusch, Raymond. Authoritarian Power and State Formation in Ba’thist Syria: Army, Party, and Peasant. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1990, 350 pp.
Kienle, Eberhard. Ba’th v. Ba’th: The Conflict between Syria and Iraq 1968-1989. New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1990, 227 pp.
Palmer, Monte. The Politics of the Middle East. Itasca, IL: F.E. Peacock, 2002.
Pfaff, Richard. The Function of Arab Nationalism: Contemporary Politics, Vol 2, No. 2. (Jan., 1970), pp. 147-167/
Seale, Patrick. Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East. London, 1998, 34-35.

A Tricky Business: An Analysis of Corporate Crime and the Case of Lord Black

INTRODUCTION
The trial and conviction of Conrad Black exemplifies the complex nature of corporate crime in the white-collar world. To understand the social problem surrounding his case, this essay will do the following. First, it will examine four articles about corporate crime. Second, it will demonstrate how conflict theory can interpret this social problem. Finally, this essay will suggest some possible preventative measures for this social problem but will conclude that there is no simple means of correcting the systemic social problem that exist in capitalist societies both in corporations and, by analogy, bureaucracies.

Four Articles on Corporate Crime
(1) In the sociological article entitled Re-Imagining Crime Prevention: Controlling Corporate Crime?, Alvesalo et al (2006) argue that there is a lack of political will at the elite level needed to prevent corporate crime in North America. The authors believe that deterring corporate crime is important for society and if there is a higher likelihood of detection then prevention is possible. Alvesalo argues that the legal justice system that seems to ignore corporate crime is not an inherent barrier to gaining justice, but must be adjusted to prosecute corporate offences more effectively. The article strongly advocates surveillance of corporate executives through government monitoring and social movements aimed at detecting corporate crime.

(2) In the criminology article entitled Sanction Threats and Appeals to Morality: Testing a Rational Choice Model of Corporate Crime, Paternoster & Simpson (1996) assess the cost/benefit analysis that a corporate executive might make before committing a corporate crime. They found that sociopaths with low moral inhibitions were most likely to commit corporate crime if the opportunity arose. The article adds that corporate criminals can be deterred if they thought legal action was possible but monitoring backroom business activity is admittedly difficult. The paper argues that appeals to morality and showing the consequences of such crimes are the best means of dealing with this social problem.

(3) In the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC)’s news article The Rise and Fall of a Media Baron, the author describes Conrad Black as a lavish intellectual tycoon whose successes in the media business gave him public notoriety. Despite his prestige, Lord Black is undergoing criminal proceedings in the United States as a white-collar offender . The article outlines his criminal charges that include personally claiming money that should have been distributed to Hollinger shareholders, billing exotic personal vacations to his company’s account and also racketeering under the RICO Act . The victims are primarily company shareholders in this trial.

(4) In the Maclean’s magazine article Laying Down His Friend For His Life, Mark Steyn central objective is to discredit the testimony of Conrad Black’s former business partner David Radler who is the centre-piece of the prosecution’s case . Steyn’s decries the U.S criminal justice system that is allowing Radler’s plea-bargain agreement which will reduce his sentence and damage Black’s defence . Mark Steyn repeatedly gives a commendable portrayal of Conrad Black as a victim of both betrayal by his close friend and the U.S. legal system which has turned against a successful entrepreneur.

The Conflict Theory Perspective interpretation of Corporate Crime

Corporate crime can be interpreted by using the conflict theory perspective. Conflict theory sees corporate crime through the lens of economic inequality. Karl Marx’s radical critical-conflict approach states that social institutions further legitimize class-based society. In addition, class dictates the type of crime an individual will commit, hence corporate executives commit types of corporate crimes. Conflict theory points out that the economic inequalities within the capitalist society disproportionately incarcerate poor people while seemingly giving special status to criminals based on wealth, power and prestige. This occurs since capitalism will always favour the unscrupulous bourgeoisie who manipulate various social institutions to protect their personal wealth. According to Alvesalo, the elite members such as judges, business-people and some journalists do not see their bourgeois friends as criminals even if there is questionable activity at play. A conflict theory interpretation should also note that there is a legal grey area for corporate crime that may intentionally make prosecution, punishment and sentencing difficult.

Lord Black and the Conflict Theory Perspective

From the conflict theory perspective, Conrad Black is unique because the power struggle is not between the proletariat and the bourgeois but between competing members of the bourgeoisie: the shareholders (with U.S. government support) versus Black and other executives of Hollinger International. I argue, then, that Conrad Black’s case is an example of a backlash from the capitalist elite against a member of their own class. As discussed by Alvesalo, most corporate crime is hidden behind-the-scenes. However, sometimes justice for the manipulation of shareholders becomes publicly demanded . The backlash occurs because corporate criminal charges expose the abuses of the bourgeois class thereby damaging the legitimacy of the capitalist superstructure. As perpetuators of economic inequality, there is a need to protect the capitalist corporations against threats to their legitimacy. Therefore, I believe the U.S. government is primarily protecting the capitalist system by holding a blatant abuser to account. This is in order to protect the overall bourgeoisie from the threat of a mobilized proletariat. Paternoster & Simpson would point out that Conrad Black was attempting to manipulate shareholders because he could rationally deduce that the legal consequences would be limited. The conflict perspective would argue that a high profile corporate executive such as Conrad Black is being publicly humiliated to deter others from abusing the status quo and thereby perpetuating the capitalist system.

In the power relationship, corruption arises because there is no one to hold executives accountable at the top of a corporate hierarchy. The most successful businesspeople end up running organizations by strategic exploitation and using every opportunity to advance themselves. I think that this exercise likely makes them less concerned with morality and more concerned about winning in the struggle to maximize self-interest. At the same time, executive criminality is very difficult to prosecute because executives are skilled at backroom dealing which does not produce much evidence for a criminal case, as is the issue in Conrad Black’s trial.

Problematic Media

Using the conflict perspective, some problematic issues with the Steyn article are noteworthy. The problem surrounds the fact that Conrad Black, until recently, controlled a massive media-empire. I believe that Mark Steyn’s pro-Conrad Black bias occurred in his article because his editor at Maclean’s magazine Ken Whyte is a former employee of the defendant. In addition, Conrad Black’s current wife Barbara Amiel writes for Maclean’s magazine and could not accept criticism of her husband in the same publication. These are two examples of the concentration of the media-ownership that leads to protection of vested interests of leading capitalists who have influential friends.

Conclusion: Social Policy to mitigate the negative consequences of the social problem

Some useful social policies may help to mitigate this social problem. I would suggest there be stronger regulatory agencies, more government intervention, transparency between corporate executive and shareholder and moral education of business leaders. Admittedly, solving this social problem will not be easy and capital flight is a common threat against attempts to allow stricter monitoring of corporate activities. White-collar criminals have a special status in society and make it is difficult to prosecute corporate crime when and if it happens. Unfortunately, the negative consequences of this type of crime tend to be more widespread. This fact makes it imperative that something be done to curb the abuses of those in positions of power. More research is necessary in this field.

Work Cited
Alvesalo, A, Tombs, S, Virta, E & Whyte, D. Re-imagining crime prevention:
Controlling corporate crime? Crime, Law & Social Change Vol. 45: 1-25, (2006).
Paternoster, Raymond, Simpson, Sally. Sanction Threats and Appeal to Morality:
Testing a Rational Choice Model of Corporate Crime. Law & Society Review, Volume 30, Number 3 (1996).
Kendall, Diana et al. Social problems in a diverse society. Pearson Education Canada,
Toronto, Canada, (2007).
Steyn, Mark. Laying Down His Friend For His Life. Maclean’s: Volume 120, Number
20, May 28th, 2007.
http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/black_conrad/rise-fall.html

Stephen Lewis and the Race Against Time


Introduction to Race Against Time

Stephen Lewis is the UN Secretary-General’s special envoy for HIV/AIDS in Africa, one of the most influential academics dealing with African politics in North America. The Race Against Time was about Lewis’ experience in Africa. Africa’s 48 countries are damaged by the departure of colonalization, the cold war etc. Stephen Lewis has been dedicated after his many trips to Africa. Nails and coffins are not just metaphors in Africa. He was told stories by survivors of dead parents. He told the story of a girl, with piercing green eyes, who could barely speak. Many of the people he met were HIV positive. These parents are most concerned about whether their children will know them. The children of Africa are becoming increasingly parentless as generations lapse into the cycle of death and renewal. Lewis has been deeply touched by the emotional impact of what he encountered on his journeys, given it’s vast differences with his Canadian lifestyle. He wants other to care about Africa as much as he does. Visiting, and working in African has been an emotionally significant experience for Lewis.

Lewis’ African Experiences

Lewis flunked out of the University of Toronto. He worked for the Socialist International in London, England in 1960. David Lewis was his father. Social Democratic past. Having visited a majority of the countries on the continent, Stephen Lewis fell in love with Africa, particularly Ghana. He taught English in Akra. Lewis fell in love with his students (platonically). Lewis believed that people there are universally friendly, loving and open….He found out years later that many of his students had been killed in the 1970s-80s. Lewis has been deeply impacted by their deaths. In the 1950s and 60s, Africa was an exciting place of new potential. But AIDS and SAP changed everything.


AIDS & HIV: West Africa is only able to contain the virus. In the South, Aids is out of control. Grandmothers have stepped in to help the ill. There were 36 orphaned children in the village where HIV was first diagnosed in 1982, according to Lewis’ visit. There are 1000s of families where the head of the household is under 15 years old. With the death of the mother, children have to fend for themselves. Who is doing anything for the orphans?

Hunger Food: all communities are hungry. Poverty used to be about having no money. Lewis notes that Mozambique to Swaziland, these people are not asking for drugs but want food. These people were desperate about food, starvation is massive. Aids treatment is very difficult without food. Combating any disease is difficult if lack of food is a factor. Entire generations of skilled labour are wiped out in the scourge of AIDS. The solution is to move towards prevention and education. BUT without food none of this is possible. Africa can be helped at its foundation: food production.


Structural Adjustment Policy: The SAP is the imposition of conditionality using macroeconomic theories implemented by the IMF. It is right wing economic thinking. They impose ill-conceived conditionality on Africa that is extremely damaging. Making aid conditional leads to deaths. You can’t adhere to an economic dialect when people are dying, according to Lewis. The cutbacks on spending in African countries are imposed by the IMF and the World Bank. There are user fees for health and user fees for school. At the heart of structural adjustment by the banks is the curtailing of the public sector and enhancing the private sector. This is at the expense of the civil society. People cannot afford healthcare. In exchange for African nations improving their governance would receive financial support from Western nations. The cerebral aristocrats at the World Bank are more interested in structural organization than the vulnerability of people. SAPs were driven to spearhead African economic recovery. Jeffrey Sachs believes terrible mistakes were made in Africa as well. But the World Banks and IMF were so smug and arrogant about the human consequences of their policy. They ignored the evidence that economies were not responding to the macroeconomic strategy. The African people were a laboratory for economic experiments.


Primary Education: Catholic schools are claiming that condoms are not successful in preventing AIDS, according to Lewis’ travels. The students wanted reliable information about condoms. Girls are being pressured into having sex. The pandemic is massive in Africa. The UN demands that all children should gain from schooling. Schooling allows better health, opportunity, and economic growth. Universal primary education is a primary source of economic growth. UniCef abdicated responsibility from the principle of universal education. Lewis believes that school fees should be abolished. Lewis sees fees as a deterrent to attendance. He doesn’t discuss the quality of teachers…Schooling has costs but those should be overcome. Lewis says that if AIDS, Food aren’t an issue, primary education is the goal. A World Bank loan was dependent on Zimbabwe’s imposition of school fees in 1997. The illumination of school fees is becoming an endless talk but no walk. When Uganda removed school fees (during an election), the number of students tripled. In theory, the UN and everyone supported universal education. Lewis takes issue with African people who are willing to compromise on education. The media does not punish world leaders for ignoring the education crisis. Western ambassadors were stubbornly opinionated about their views while they are really just angry that they were posted in Africa & never venture out of the capital city. Some kids are awarded scholarships to Secondary Education at age five before all of the students can develop.


International Aid: Lewis notes that subsidization of American and EU farmers costs 5 times the amount of foreign aid being given to African nations. This means that the EU gives their cows $2.50 USD per day where as Africans live off of less than $1.00 per day. The totalitarian regimes in Africa prevent G8 Nations from acting to aid the pandemic of AIDS in Africa, according to Lewis.

The Scourge of Debt: In 1988, the developing country ambassadors were skeptical of the economic growth through trade and a fair agreement at the Uruguay round of discussion. Other than trade, the African debt is also a massive setback. African countries are spending much on debt reduction and therefore can’t get healthcare. Because of Totalitarian regimes, African had 294 Billion dollars of debt from 1970-1992. Africa paid back 260 Billion mostly of interest. Africa is still 230 Billion dollars in debt. Africa is forever in a cycle of debt reduction. The Pentagon wrote-off 31 Billion dollars of debt in Iraq post-2003. They should be able to do the same for African nations.

Official Development Assistance: Lewis advocates the ODA. The ODA is sourced from the G8 nations. Tony Blair called for 0.7% of GDP by the G8. Lester B. Pearson set the benchmark of 0.7% of GDP for foreign aid. Few countries have come close to that number, unfortunately. Scandinavian countries are the only countries to go beyond 0.7% GDP. The US and Japan do not come close to fulfilling the basic benchmark. Italy is unreliable. UK and France promise to meet the benchmark by 2012. Japan wanted a seat on the Security Council and needed support of the African countries at the G8. SO, Japan made a promise to double its support from their previous numbers, unfortunately Japan doesn’t contribute much at all. The US only gives 3 Billion dollar per year. Bush might double that funding.

Political Short-Term Leadership: Paul Martin will only be around for a while. Bush won’t be around in 2010. Blair will be gone as well. Most G8 leaders in 2005 will be out to pasture. Martin propounds the vitues of the policy but doesn’t achieve the goal. The responsibility will be for the next set of leaders. Promises that are not kept internationally are a serious moral failure. Lewis has not faith in the political leadership.


Counter-Arguments to ODA: The problem is that most of the aid doesn’t get to the people who need it on the ground. 60% of ODA should be called phantom aid. Where does it go: technical aid (overpaid consultants) and administrative costs (inflated overhead). If the phantom aid was made real it would have dramatic positive effects. The G8 manipulates figures. They have betrayed Africa.

Women in Multilateralism: United Nations in 1985 didn’t have a single woman in the executive level. You need a lifetime to understand a project like communications at the UN. But few women are actually involved until 1997. Male authority is difficult to break down. Equality of man and women is a human right. Men head all IMF, UN, WORLD BANK. The imbalance is striking between women & men. The promise of women’s rights is a lie. Tony Blair created a commission where only 3 women of 17 spots were positioned. Social democrats are supposed to be sensitive to this issue but Tony Blair is not really in the same league as Lewis. Blair’s Commission for Africa was really weak on women’s topics. You cannot be serious about Africa if you are not serious about women in your own policy administration. Institutional rejection of women’s issues is widespread. African government’s don’t have watchdogs for women’s rights.

 

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Warren Kinsella’s The War Room } Running Campaigns { Synopsis

A Synopsis of The War Room by Warren Kinsella

Political Strategies for Business, NGOs, and Anyone Who Wants to Win

{This is a synopsis that contains some verbatim elements (probably) so there’s that!}

A Synopsis of The War Room by Warren Kinsella

Foreword by the Right Honourable Jean Chrétien [Former Canadian Prime Minister] – “I am delighted that people have bought Warren Kinsella’s new book, but I would be more delighted, and so would they, if they bought mine. In all seriousness, I can reveal that Warren is passionate, loyal and a good guy to have on your side in a political fight. When he worked for me, and afterwards, he never hesitated to fight the good fight. His book is about how war rooms can help you to win. I encourage everyone to read it.”

Introduction: Welcome to the War Room

Warren Kinsella begins by explaining the concept of the war room. James Carville, George Stephanopoulos, popularized it in the media and the public during the 1992 Presidential election campaign. They needed to move quickly on Clinton’s alleged sex scandals, past drug use, and draft dodging. The War Room is perceived as a pejorative term when it is not. Media has evolved and continues to do so. Kinsella explains that the voting public doesn’t have time to study politics closely. The public needs the message quickly and therefore a new political technology needs to be honed. The War Room is a defensive and centralized organization within political campaigns that disseminates spin in response to attacks from the opposing camp(s). The rules of campaigning make it imperative to have quick responses to attacks. Politicians publicly decry attacks and talk about changing the way politics is done but ultimately the public love a good car accident and/or political attack. The politics of personal destruction is the name of this game. This is the premise of the entire book.

Kinsella emerged as a young Calgary lawyer who jumped onto the Chrétien campaign in 1989 during which the Meech Lake Accord dominated Canadian political discourse. Warren Kinsella opposed Meech. After learning in detail how a war room functions, Kinsella advised Chrétien that the 1993 election required a near carbon copy of James Carville’s war room. This book discusses Kinsella’s experience in the Federal elections of 1993, 2000 and Ontario provincial election of 2003. Kinsella is an investigative journalist at heart: who used his talents to get dirty to help his candidates. Negative ads work, Kinsella is nasty with a cause. His Conservative adversaries called Kinsella the ‘Prince of Darkness’. Kinsella does not deny that people that he hates in return hate him. For Kinsella, loyalty is everything. He will go down the campaign and defend his friends viciously. Anyone who breeches his trust cannot be trusted.

Lesson One: Let’s Get Started!

The 1896 US Presidential election: McKinley’s campaign becomes historic as the first with a campaign manager who orchestrated massive pilgrimages to see McKinley speak instead of having him travel the United States. Campaign managers must impose order upon chaos. Campaigns are a mishmash of emotions, egos and ambitions that are sometimes too big, and budgets, resource and timetables too small. Campaigns need money. It is the core of a successful effort. However, the best people don’t need money they want to fight for beliefs and ideas. Campaigns need to be structured with the manager-type, media person, head policy wonk, the fundraiser, the volunteer coordinator and the war room director. A campaign should have a calendar of events, with a linear plan of action. Campaigns must understand their candidate. Paul Martin was foolish in being all things to all people, for example (more on him later). Campaigns need detailed records of what the opposition have said. Opposition research is about scrutinizing the public record. Stockwell Day supported a flat-tax, for example (more on him later). Campaigns need The Message. Campaigns need to plan for contingencies.

Kinsella believes that James Carville is a GOD-like communicator. Political campaigns aren’t places for original ideas. Emotions defeat reason in politics. Carville had an interesting career. Demeaning your opponent in a funny way is extremely effective. Carville believes that strategy is hard and tactics are easy. Strategy is an overall plan like the now famous 1992 campaign:
• Change Versus More of the Same
• It’s the Economy, Stupid
• And Don’t Forget Health Care

Lesson Three: Get Your Message Out (For Free)!

Gandhi hated the media, reporters and photographers. Even the man behind Satyagraha had a negative opinion of that profession. Political consultants hate journalists for the same fundamental reasons. They are ‘intensely evil bottom feeders’; inherently driven by a desire to bring politicians down. Journalists are naturally drawn to negativity, criticism and attacks.

Warren Kinsella was a journalist, so he sympathizes with both sides. He, in fact, sees mainstream media as the boards in a hockey rink. They contain the players or political actors on the ice and restrict, control and guide the political discourse. The media has agenda-setting power. The boards are your friends because it’s true. The media is your friend, kind of. The boards are hard, the media are equally tough and will be there well after your political careers have blow in the wind. The media, like the boards, can be helpful for the players/politicians on the ice rink. During the campaign, candidates will run low on funds etc. There are no shortages of problems. With the right shoot of the puck, with the right spin you can avoid the most troublesome obstacles on the ice.

Research data shows that political consultants hate the media. But they need to recognize that they are bound together by the political discourse for eternity. Consultants need to realize that the media can save your expensive campaign money. Lots of money. If you have a story to tell the media can tell it. You need to gain earned media coverage. You need to learn how to control the media. Perot ’92 campaign spent millions of dollars to control the message because they couldn’t control the media. Gary Hart’s 1987 campaign was destroyed when the media followed him around to see all the women he was doing on the side. He should have taken Kinsella’s advice.

Read Kinsella’s Twelve Handy and Immutable Media Rules:

1) The Press is the Enemy, Sort of: Chris Matthews said the mission of the journalist is to find a good story, which constitutes bad news reporting. The media aren’t entirely the enemy but never believe they are your friends. Never talk to a journalist like he or she is your friend. If you need a friend on the campaign get a fucking dog.

2) Leave No Charge Unanswered: Hit back or lose. Don’t wait long when someone is attacking you. With the 24 hour – 7 day news you must be quick or dead. Never leave a charge unanswered.

3) Nothing Is Off the Record: Even when you ask a journalism to listen off the record, journalists will not turn off the recorder. When you lay the ground rules with the journalist recognize that they will take a juicy story a thousand miles over following proper decorum. Proceed with caution!

4) Politics Is War: Journalists love militaristic analogies. Blood, corpses, murder very intriguing. Get attention by using apocalyptic terminology because the media will lap it up.

5) Keep It Simple, Stupid: Carville believed it in the Bill Clinton war room. So should you. First of all, most voters are completely overwhelmed, they don’t have time to learn the party platforms: make it simple. Second of all, political reporters don’t have time or the inclination to analyse policy documents. Campaigns are up against “data smog”. Don’t insist on making it complicated. Relegate academics to serving coffee.

6) Get It Right the First Time: Dan Quayle’s June 1992 visit to an elementary school in Trenton where he told a student that Potato was spelt with an “e”. Don’t make a massive mistake. It’s media gold. Try not to be gaffe ridden.

7) Swords Are For Falling On: Stockwell Day made an analogy involving the brain drain and the Niagara Falls’ draining from north to south. Unfortunately, it drains southwest to northwest into the Ocean. Day blamed someone else for his mistake instead of accepting responsibility. The Bottom Line? Mistake-making campaigners should, if the circumstances warrant, fess up, laugh at themselves, and then move on. Periodically falling on one’s sword is excellent politics.

8) The Orchestra Pit: Ailes, a Nixon adviser, said that if one candidate says that they have a solution to the Middle East crisis and the other candidate falls off the front of the stage in mid-sentence guess who makes the front page? When given choice journalists always go negative.

9) Spin Is B.S: You can’t shine shit. Spin can only get you so far. The media love to do research that contradicts your statements.

10) TV Is Pictures: B.C. Liberal Premier Gordon Campbell once said to Warren, “It’s 10 percent what you say, 20 percent how you say it, and 70 percent how you look.” TV anchors have tiny black hearts. TV exposes how they perspire, their body language and how they dilation.

11) Sound Bites Earn Earned Media: The average sound bite in the1960s was 42.3 seconds. Now it’s 9.8 seconds. Kinsella believes that if it can’t be said in 10 seconds then it probably isn’t ever going to be explained properly. Work on your sound bite skills.

12) The Media Is a Special Interest Group: Voters tend to look for evidence that corroborates what they already believe or suspect. The media is a special interest group aligned with the enemy. But they love to be spun.

Journalists love writing about the horse race but not about the policy behind the fight. Opinion columns do not change anyone’s voting behaviour. In 2006, only the Toronto Star wanted a Liberal government. But such editorials have virtually zero impact on voters. Newspaper endorsements do not have an effect on voter choice.

Lesson Four: Get Your Message Out (For Money)!

Warren Kinsella named his company after the infamous 1964 LB Johnson ad; it is called Daisy Consulting Group. “The stakes are too high for you to stay home.” The Daisy ad is the most influential in political history. It only appeared once on September 7, 1964. But it had a profound effect. Goldwater was being painted as insane. Advertisements should arouse basic emotions. Goldwater was a radical. The ad counterbalanced his absurdity as a presidential candidate. The Democrats and their ad agencies wanted to show that Goldwater would have his finger on the nuclear button. Kinsella details how the famous ad was created. It was controversial, and effective. Goldwater underestimated the power of the spot.

Campaigns should always try to get paid media. Paid media allows you full control of the messaging. Truman shook hands with over 15 to 20 million people. It was personal back then. But with the media, information can been transferred. You need a unique selling proposition (USP). First, the ad must make a proposition to the customer being targeted. Second, uniqueness. The ad had to be able to make a claim about the product or service that the competition could not. Three, the proposition needed to be strong. Need to motivate the masses.

The classic political hacks of the Eisenhower administration sent out new releases that were shocking simplistic and argue forcefully for his elect ability. If you have “a bus driver who drives through a lawn sign, living-room and kitchen, you don’t say he had good intentions. You get a new driver.” Nixon’s checkers speech: learn about it.

Research shows that negative advertisements work. There are two reasons. First, TV is an emotional medium, and emotional messages work best with voters. Negative ads are crafted in the best dramatic tradition; they contain characterization, plot and conflict. Second, negative ads work because they are negative. Newsprint used to be owned by political leaders in Canada. R. B. Bennett set up hilarious ads where two people had conversations about how bad Mackenzie King was in 1925-30, slush funds etc. King won in 1935 but said that such ads should be banned.

There are Six Elements for a successful media campaign. 1st element, you need to develop a media plan that works. Consultants focus on (GRPs) gross rating points. The average GRP will expose a person to an ad at least once. So that 500 GRPs ensure that each person sees an advertisement 5 times. 2nd element, timing. There are unexpected events during the campaign. You should buy during the beginning and near the end of a campaign. You need to connect political objectives with advertising timing. 3rd element, get the target audience. The pollsters usually reveal the demographics, target those you want and need. 4th element, you need to spend strategically for areas of priority. Don’t spend where you are geographically disadvantaged, there will always be winner and losers in Canadian political geography. 5th element, mix your message from various media. Al Gore did shows like David Letterman and Jay Leno for a reason. Chrétien appeared on Mike Bullard. 6th element, 30-second slot is the workhorse for campaign advertising. Use the 60 or 30 minutes slots. Despite the complexity of ad buying, it is really rewarding if you make the right strategic risks.

Lesson Five: Get Creative!

A bit of career advice: if you want to avoid criticism, or embarrassed,  or psychological warfare by even your relatives and closest friends – don’t get into politics. Become a bureaucrat or business person instead. Kinsella was told by Romeo Leblanc (former Governor General of Canada) to stop “fucking around” during the 1993 campaign. Secrecy is important in the politics as a job title. According to Kinsella, dirty things will go down, you need to be very hush-hush. You can’t achieve great things without taking great risks. Not taking risks is a risk itself.

In the 2000 campaign, The Fundamental Day (a documentary) appeared on CBC. It showed that Stockwell Day (former leader of the Canadian Alliance) was very religious and was antagonistic to a pluralistic and urban democracy according to Kinesella. Day didn’t approve of abortion, lesbians, gays and single mothers, generally. Day spoke about ‘God’s law being clear.’ Day even talked about creationism. The CBC documentary was pure gold for Liberal strategist Warren Kinsella. In light of the airing, Kinsella plotted the perfect counter attack. He first had every local Liberal Party campaign watch the documentary. Although Day was a creationist, it really doesn’t matter. What Kinsella emphasized was the separation of church and state. Stockwell Day was going to impose his personal and moral vision on a Federal level which is not viable in such a religiously diverse country. James Carville (the ragin’ cajun) believed that you need to be able to make a joke about yourself and there is nothing wrong with going after someone with a nice funny statement. Warren Kinsella believes that “if I’m gonna go down, I’m gonna go down in flames.” Kinsella took a chance.

On the CTV’s Canada Am, Kinsella argued with other parties. He never dealt with the peripheral parties focusing his attack on the Canadian Alliance. Kinsella famously pulled out a Barney doll from The Flintstones and said that it was important to remind Day that The Flintstones was not a documentary. Sometimes you need to be creative. This attack argued that Day could not be trusted with the affairs of the Canadian people. Was the Barney ploy a dirty trick? Is Kinsella a smear doctor? Well, dirty tricks have been going on as long as politics. There are detective agencies that spend all their time researching political candidates. As the Turner people lurched towards defeat they became more desperate and sneaky. 1999 U.S. Gallup poll, for example, showed that fully three-quarters of those surveyed considered ethical political behaviour to be ‘very important’. Judy LaMarsh followed Diefenbaker around the country but her stocking strategy backfired. Get creative, don’t smoke drugs but be creative. Being creative means being willing to take risks etc. You have to be willing to get embarrassed badly. Always use emotional appeals. This is the way to win on the campaign trail, according to Kinsella.

Lesson Six: Get Tough!

There are causes worth fighting tough for: Kinsella despises Big Tobacco. It is an emotional issue for him. His father died of lung cancer after a life of smoking. Usually the issue is personal to you. You should always re-assess the effectiveness of your strategy and tactics before and after the campaign. With Big Tobacco, you can’t defeat them with statistics or try to win the day with columns and graphs and charts and numbers. If you come up with a hard-hitting story versus money thrown at a team, the simple story wins. Real stories are the battlefield. The tobacco merchants will never win the war. This is a real war. It’s pretty hard for an opponent like Big Tobacco to punch you if they already have my fist in their face. So Kinsella argues that you should go negative.

Researchers emphasize that going negative is unpopular with voters. But the fact is that empirical measures cannot quantify data that is sub-conscious. The political subconscious loves a good smear campaign. The stakes are too high to go on a subtle attack. There was one battle the Kinsella remembers well where negative attacks worked. The Chrétien/Martin leadership crisis.

Don’t Commit Regicide: Paul Martin’s people reconstituted the Liberal Party oligarchy with incompetent people that destroyed the party’s viability. Kinsella mentions that David Herle didn’t accept his help. Brian Guest who is a controversial advisor for Stéphane Dion didn’t respond to Kinsella’s offer of help in a fairly backhanded e-mail. Chrétien had a 50% approval rating in 2003. He offered to stay for the Sponsorship scandal but Martin was too ambitious to wait. A civil war broke-out in the Liberal party during 2004. Martin’s people dumped Copps as well as tried to prevent Stéphane Dion from taking his seat. They then invited people like Jean Lapierre into the cabinet. Martin’s people said that the ‘Clarity Act’ was useless. Martin was a soft nationalist in Quebec. Martin then decided to turn the RCMP investigation into a commission into the sponsorship scandal, which would effectively pin all the criminality on Chrétien’s people. Paul Martin went around the country saying he was ‘mad as hell’ about the sponsorship scandal: Liberal Party dropped 15 points in one week. Kinsella was attacked with legal retribution from the angry Martinites who they wanted to control. The Martinites committed regicide.

If they listened to Kinsella things would be different. “Kinsella’s Four New Rules of Media Management”

1st, Crisis Management Rule: never call a big hairy crisis, a crisis. Never let them know that you’re in a crisis like Paul Martin did.

2nd, Public Servant Rule: these people are the most powerful people in Ottawa. Be nice to them, they do good work. Paul Martin declared war on members of the public service. It sent a negative signal to the entire bureaucratic institutions in Ottawa.

3rd, Don’t Do Stupid Things. A) keep you story straight. It’s probably not a good idea to say one thing in a press conference and then let you staff run-around saying something else. Calling Chrétien (the preceding PM) names is confusing and stupid. B) If You Take a Swing at a Professional Political brawler from a Small Town in Rural Quebec, Make Damn Sure You Knock Him Out But Good: otherwise he’s a liability to get up and beat the shit out of you.

4th, Party Leader Rule. Protect your leader very well. Protect the leader you are loyal, you must have Blind Faith. Kinsella resolutely believed that Martin was headed to a minority on his blog.

Martin should have said that the buck stops at his desk instead of blaming his predecessor. He should have said that as finance minister he should have known about the scandal and add that he plans to pass into law to make sure it doesn’t happen again. Martin should have attacked Harper’s statement that Canada was a 2nd rate welfare state. Kinsella would have had signs saying Canada is ‘Number One’.

Negative Campaigning isn’t negative for democracy. It’s part of discourse. The Annenberg Campaign Mapping Project (ACMP) discourse into three types:

(1) Advocacy, which are arguments in favour of a politician’s position,
(2) Contrast: which are arguments contrasting two or more political choices,
(3) Attack: which are arguments critical of an opponent or the opponent’s position on something.

Only 3 are negative. Reporters are more negative in a day than you will be in your lifetime.

Negative campaigning isn’t becoming more widespread. It just isn’t. It’s true that after every campaign, editorialists and political scientists churn our pious thumb-sucker opinion pieces about how awful and nasty and unpleasant the latest election was. A poll in the 1996 Clinton v Dole race showed that negative ads increased both the turnout and vote share. Reporters and opponents should research the political public record. It’s only fair. But war rooms can go too far.

One ad went too far. It’s 1993, on day 38 of the 48-day federal campaign, the Liberal war room snapped to attention. Allan Gregg and John Tory led the PC campaign ads. There were two spots about Jean Chrétien, which had been ‘decidedly curious and ineffective’. Their campaign was viciousness. The new ads were different from anything else that had appeared in public discourse up to that time. The ads asked: “Is this a prime minister?” The woman said she would be embarrassed and was clearly referring to Chrétien’s facial paralysis. This ad struck the public as the testament to the fact that politicians will do anything to get elected. Everyone agreed that the ads were despicable and yet they had been group tested with no problems. The Tories wanted to secure the support of the PC voters. Gregg used shots from a press conference, he didn’t feel that this was wrong. They used pictures of Chrétien. Like MacLean’s magazine had. It was about his policy not his face. But the damage was monumental.

A lot of PC candidates apologized for the ads; distancing themselves from them. Sinclair Stevens sent a letter to Kinsella at the war room, which explained his complete embarrassment. Campbell apologized for the ads. She accepted blame and pulled them. Gregg felt that Chrétien was weak on the economy (NAFTA) and foreign policy. Allan Gregg is a normal guy, he just had no idea the ads were going to backfire. The campaign wasn’t getting desperate at all. It was just a political blunder. Campbell tried to distance herself from Gregg’s ad. Allan Gregg maintains that she approved the ads. He didn’t think they were making fun of his face.

Kinsella said: the facts remain that they used unflattering pictures of Chrétien. But you must pick your battles. Don’t waste your passion. Pick a gift only for a cause you believe in.

1st, the critical statement of fact you are making about your opponents has to be scrupulously accurate.

2nd, the allegation you are making must be an even-handed take on the facts, that is, it can’t be so wildly out of context that if offends people’s sense of fairness. Don’t heap ridicule on yourself.

3rd, the critical statement must be on the public record – what is sometimes called ‘quotes and votes’.

Get passionate, get involved, and get tough!

Lesson Seven: Get the Facts and Numbers!

Kinsella recounts a McGuinty event where a 19-year shouted attacks criticizing the Liberal Party. Kinsella found out his name, corroborated by phoning the Conservative headquarters and emailed the kids resume to every body covering the event in the news media. All in 45 minutes. Should have been 35. The Conservatives planted the kid and were made to look stupid, dishonest and desperate by Kinsella.

Research is essential. Corroborating claims is essential. Thomas Jefferson had several mistresses all of them slaves. The opposition accused him of this but there was no proof. 200 years later the truth came out. Jefferson won the presidency anyway. The value of professional political consultants was the injection of large sums of cash not the system by aspiring politicians and advocacy groups. They needed people who could navigate the competitive media environment. Being factually accurate is tremendously important. You need quick opposition research and response. The need for speed in the CNN, NBC news cycle is paramount.

It is fair, in some cases, to probe a person’s personal life. Buchanan was a rank anti-European. Bush’s attack dogs found out he drives a Mercedes-Benz sedan, a European car. Pure hypocrisy. Opposition are always interested in missed votes in the US. Scanning for fibs, contradictions are effective. March 2008: Clinton claims she was shoot at in Bosnia. Campbell’s EH-101 copter flip-flop was a heightened by a Grit young liberal dressed as a chicken. Resume inflation is another area of research. Campbell went to the London School of Economics but never completed her thesis. Campbell had not paid back the money to attend the London School of Economics. In June 1993, Liberals flooded the Access to Information bureaucrats with demands for Campbell’s expense accounts. Someone sent a nasty affidavit’s about Campbell’s divorces. Property records and list of political donors. One of the companies that had supported Campbell in 1993 had received donations in national defence contracts. Checking the facts is always a good idea.

An example of getting the facts wrong by the PCs in 1993. Jean Chrétien released the Red Book at the start of the campaign in 1993 risking that it’s effect would be deluded by the end. The Tories released a blue binder full of attacks on Chrétien’s positions in the platform prior to the Red Book’s release. The blue book was desperate attack of costings in a Red Book that had not been released yet. The credibility problem with the media hurt the Conservatives for weeks to come. Technology has made aggressiveness in politics a must. This is similar to the Dewey Defeats Truman error in the 1948 Chicago Daily Tribune.
The 2006 Leadership Race is another example. The Super Weekend of delegate selection was in preparation for the Montreal convention in December of that year. Michael Ignatieff was at 29.6% of the delegates. He was rumoured to be ahead of the ex officio vote as well pushing him to 35%. This is called A Great Big Honking Lead! Bob Rae had only 20%….Allan Gregg was saying that Bob Rae would be the winner in mid-September. Polling mistakes happen often. Kinsella explains empirical research polling techniques. Polls have effected the electoral process. Polls can be right but they can also be disastrously wrong.

The push polling in South Carolina against John McCain was very effective: “How do you feel about McCain’s legislation that proposed the largest tax increase in United States history?” McCain wanted to tax churches, McCain had an illegitimate Vietnamese child. The idea is to manipulate public opinion, not change it. Push polling is unethical. Researching factual information is ethical. Push polling is not.

Lesson Eight: Get the Handle Scandal Manual!

Kinsella believes that Sponsorships work. They promote a cause or initiative. Helping sports team, charity fundraisers are a great service for a cause. Governments do sponsorships. In 1995, they cut spending on ads and polls. The Quebec brand was aggressively promoted. Kinsella wants the Canadian flag at Quebec post offices again! Should we stop promoting Canada in Quebec? Kinsella fundamentally believes that Martin should not have opened a public Commission but should have left it to the RCMP.

The Bush attack on Clinton criminalized him with effect. Kinsella knew that the defence of Chrétien’s legacy was at stake and planned a campaign of anti-defamation. With the help of Carville, Kinsella developed his technique for victory (excluding the details of the Sponsorship Scandal):

1) Don’t Get Mad, Get Even! If you look guilty, if you look worried, you’re screwed. Make them sweat. Make them angry. Don’t ever let them see you sweat!

2) Magnify Mistakes, Misspending, and Misstatements! When someone is out to magnify your mistakes, misspending, and misstatements then you need to return the favour. It’s the polite thing to do. It’s the smart thing to do, as well.

3) Hypocrites Always Deserve What They Get! Chuck Guité’s daughter was accused of getting preferential contracts while Gomery’s daughter was getting work from the commission through Ogilvy Renault.

4) Mock ‘Em, Sock ‘Em, Rock ‘Em! Jean Chrétien’s personalized golf ball interrogation is historic for demeaning the pettiness of the commission. The best way to defeat someone is to mock him or her. Humour is always an excellent strategy.

5) Tell the Truth and Take Responsibility! If someone tells a bald-faced lie, go after him. But don’t emulate him.

6) Motives Matter! People want to know why someone is chasing a scandal. Is it because they have to or want to?

7) Expose the Bullies! If a bully accuses you of something: rejoice! All the Martin people cared about was power. Getting it, keeping it. Martin supported Jean LaPierre for fuck-sakes! Martin says he loves public policy but hates politics. Martin destroyed Sheila Copps: Martin engaged in Regicide.

8) Get and Keep the People on Your Side! Martin did the exact opposite and it cost him everything.

9) Hit ‘Em Hard, Hit ‘Em Fast, Hit ‘Em Often! Speed kills your opponent. Never let a charge go unanswered. And Sponsorships work!

Kinsella uses the Sponsorship scandal as the case study in this section. He gives you information while simultaneously attacking the Sponsorship Commission. Kinsella attacks John Gomery for having loose-lips. Gomery revealed subtle bias against Jean Chrétien. Gomery’s daughter made a lot of money on the Commission as well as some PC friends. Gomery said he hated being lied to: implying that Liberals had lied to him. The Gomery commission cost the government a lot of money: it was an NDP line. Kinsella deeply despised the Martin people. He hates hypocrites after all! Gomery called Chrétien ‘small-town cheap’. Chrétien bit Gomery’s head off. Kinsella goes crazy jingoistic with the details of the Commission. Chrétien humiliated Gomery at the commission. The problem with the Martin people is that they lied too often. It’s not the breaking but the cover-up. No matter what was being said Gomery was wrong, wrong, wrong.

Lesson Nine: Get Modern!

Citizen Media is the future of politics. Blogs are very valuable in politics. There aren’t many female blogs. Kinsella believes that the Internet has raised the overall quality of public debate. Citizen media is powerful. For example the Drudge Report revealed the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal while the mainstream media withheld the story for as long as they could. Kinsella explains the Lewinsky scandal and its consequences for Internet based Citizen media. In 2006, Fuddle-Duddle blogger, Thomas Hubert said Israel was a vile nation. Boris Wrzesnewskyj called for the removal of Hezbollah from Canada’s terrorist organization list. Jason Cherniak is a great blogger who fought back against these cretins. An NDP blogger also said negative things about Israel.

The moral is these stories is 1) a new era is upon us, whether you like it or not. 2) popularity of blogs has exploded, corporations and political parties have scrambled to ensure their presence in the blogosphere. 2) what happens online can have a profound consequence for citizens, organizations, government, companies and campaigns.

McCain’s website was attracting money. Obama’s is today….Dean the same. Despite the fact that James Bowie says on his blog today that Blogs aren’t important. That blogs are a liability and that anyone with ambition would be wise not to have one. Kinsella contends that this is not the case.

Ten Reasons Why Internet Bloggy Stuff Is Pretty Important

1) It’s Free: in 2006, warrenkinsella.com received 250,000 hits.

2) They’re Proudly Biased: journalistic objectivity is a joke anyway.

3) They’re Really Easy to Access: there are 1.6 Billion personal computers ww.

4) They’re the Hegelian Dialectic on Speed: public dialogue of ideas.

5) They’re Populist: you can bring in volunteers, ideas through the internets.

6) Google Power: bloggers have a high google rank sometimes.

7) Specialists Are Welcome: knowledge is diverse.

8. Interactions Are Welcome: there is a dialogue of ideas.

9) They’re Pithy as Heck: Blogs don’t take long to read.

10) They’re Fun: blogs are entertaining.

You can make a lot of money with the internet. This is where the future is going. The Virginia Tech tragedy will be remembered as the worst in US history. It will also be remembered for how Facebook users reacted to that tragedy.

Lesson Ten: Get Fighting!

Never ever give up the fight. Kinsella felt like a human piñata at times but he never quit. Everyone wanted Kinsella out of the Liberal Party. Don’t give up. Even if your wife says so. Don’t give up. You can’t quit your commitment to fight for your candidate, your campaign, or your cause. You will lose if you don’t try. Campaigns really matter despite declining rates of voter participation in elections. There are those such as James E. Campbell who say the Economics decides elections. He proved that if the GDP of the US was over 2.5% growth the incumbent won. This changed in Florida. Bush fought better and harder for the prize in 2000. Remember: W.W.C.D.; What Would Chrétien Do! Kinsella thinks that war rooms, and war roomers, have plenty to pass on to the people who don’t even work in politics. How, with smart planning and messaging and advertising – and a willingness to get tough and creative, and use every fat and figure and bit of technology at your disposal – you can beat back the scandal and the worst odds, and win. And win big……..