Lessons from a Masters In Business Administration: Dispersed Manufacturing/Li and Fung

Issues of Scope: What can our business do? What can it own? Where can it operate? General Electric’s approach is to say that its separate businesses should be ranked one or two in whatever sector they operate. If that business isn’t near the top, then GE sells it because they don’t want to be associated with mediocrity. McDonald’s decided long ago to get involved in franchising, rather than owning millions of parcels of real estate. Sound contracts and long-term relationships can be far less hassle than ownership. The ownership and value tests are more relevant in a globalized world…Could an American company with global ambitions adapt to new countries and cultures and run businesses better than local firms?  Did global growth allow you to reduce your costs? What are the realities of doing business abroad?

Dispersed Manufacturing/Li and Fung: Li and Fung was founded in Canton in 1906 to help American and English merchants to access Chinese factories. It now manages the supply chain for many of the world’s largest retailers and manufacturers. Li and Fung built their business by expanding to Singapore, Korea, Taiwan. If you wanted to make shirts in Asia, Li and Fung would find the cotton businesses, and then move the unfinished product cheaper than if you picked a single factory. This is called dispersed manufacturing, and they don’t own any of these factories. There is a fragmented global supply chain, and the tiniest step requires specialization. Li and Fung helps customers through the maze.

[This is a synopsis of several books on the MBA experience including What They Teach You At Harvard Business School by P.D. Broughton]

Lee Iacocca: Triage Is Essential In Hard Times

1979 was a War-zone for Chrysler.

In business, you need to be like an Army surgeon. You might have 40 injured people, but you only have 3 hours to save them. You need to pick the ones who have the best chance of survival. At Chrysler, there was no time to study a marginally performing car plant, you have to axe it immediately.  You need to have discipline.

First, Iacocca’s team at Chrysler had to close plants in Lyons, Michigan and Dodge Main in Hamtramck, which was the Polish district of Detroit. There were major protests over these plant closures but Iacocca had no choice.

Next, Iacocca’s team at Chrysler had to reassure suppliers that they were going to be paid on time. They needed to demonstrate that Chrysler was not going into bankruptcy even though suppliers knew their business and Chrysler’s well.

Then, Iacocca’s team at Chrysler brought in just-in-time inventory delivery. The Japanese had been doing this for years but as far back as the 1920s, Ford’s River Rouge Plant had taken ore from the boats, converted it into steel and then turned that into engine blocks within 24 hours. Ford Motor Company had just in time but with the boom years fro 1945 to 1978, the US car industry fell into old habits and lethargy.

Next, Iacocca’s team at Chrysler designed the K-cars to be 176 inches long (14’ 8’’) so that they could fit into a standard freight car. Even the financial report for 1979 was printed on cheap document paper.

Then, Iacocca’s team at Chrysler sold all the dealership real-estate they owned to ABKO from Kansas. The cash came to $90 million, which was desperately needed (timing matters), then later Iacocca had to buy back half of that property at twice the original price!

Next, Iacocca’s team at Chrysler sold all their non-North American businesses. Peugeot bought their European operations for $230 million and a 15% stake in Peugeot. They sold their military tank operations for $348 million to General Dynamics. Interestingly, the union negotiations at the time forced workers to $17 per hour instead of $20 per hour, so General Dynamics got a cheaper labour force when the contract was signed between Chrysler and General Dynamics.

Then, there were major layoffs in waves from 1970 and then 1980, both blue and white collars. This saved Chrysler $500 million in annual costs. Iacocca admits that some of firings were tragic and mistakes. Firing people is never a positive experience.

Next, Iacocca’s team at Chrysler fired the staff who had integrated the work of the line managers into a workable system. These were the Harvard Business School graduates who had never run anything, but were now telling the line manager who had done the job for 30 years how it ought to be done. Iacocca always trusts people with a dedicated background in the industry over elite educated people.

Then, Iacocca went shopping for people to buy into Chrysler. This included Volkswagen which was a very serious discussion because Chrysler was dying. The stock jumped form $11 to $14 upon the news that Volkswagen would buy for $15 shares but this was a false story.

Finally, there was the big government bailout.

This is a synopsis & analysis based on Iacocca: An Autobiography and other miscellaneous research sources. Enjoy.

Lessons from a Masters In Business Administration: Strategy Is Not Operational Efficiency

Strategy Is Not Operational Efficiency: You can run the best kebab shop in London, UK but if you are doing something that many people can copy, you are not going to make any money. You need a great strategy, but the first step is picking the right industry. Anyone can become a proofreader. The most profitable sectors in the US earning over 20% growth per year: pharmaceuticals, high-technology, financial services, discount department stores, and oil. The worst industry is airlines. Picking the right industry, one with a sound structure, where your chances of making a profit are highest, was where good strategy begins. Note that you should be interested in what you are doing with your time. Passion is also important.

[This is a synopsis of several books on the MBA experience including What They Teach You At Harvard Business School by P.D. Broughton]

Lee Iacocca: Use All Available Arguments To Justify Survival

Blame Government: Poor management had a lot to do with Chrysler’s situation in 1980, but government regulation was also used as justification for seeking a government loan guarantee for Chrysler. Government prevented the Big Three from coming together to develop more fuel-efficient cars or improve safety even though the Japanese took the opposite approach. It was illegal for GM and Chrysler to share their research according to Washington. In addition, Iacocca states that the Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 protected motorists at a cost of $19 billion and the spread of that cost was over 5 million GM cars, 2.5 million Ford cars and only 1 million Chryslers. So, if GM’s research into seatbelts cost $1 million and sold 100,000 cars, each customer paid an extra $10. If Chryslers R&D into seatbelts was $1 million and sold 20,000 cars then the cost was $50 more for each customer. Then the cost of manufacturing was much worse for Chrysler since GM’s volumes were much higher. The EPA paperwork in 1978 was 228,000 pages!

Loan guarantees had already occurred at a total of $409 billion for chemical companies, railroads, farmers, electric companies, shipbuilders, college students, and airlines. So despite public outcry, Chrysler was just following what others had done. In August 1979, G. William Miller left as chairman of the FED to become secretary of the treasury. He supported government intervention in the Chrysler case. Iacocca argued that the other two big car companies were soon to be in trouble and loosing money and that this was a problem facing American industry.

Ideologically, Iacocca could understand why others were against supporting Chrysler since he had always been against much in the way of safety regulations: It was survival of the fittest, water seeks its own level, gov’t weakens the discipline of the marketplace, changing the rules in the middle of the game, etc. The basic view was that the market would work itself out, and Chrysler would have to go bankrupt and reorganize itself. BUT Iacocca disagreed….

Iacocca went to House Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization of the Committee of Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs to ask for a $1.5 Billion loan guarantee. The reasons to support the Chrysler Loan Guarantee “Government Bailout” were the following:

  1. Yes, Chrysler: a) should not have built products on speculation, b) should not have been in the used-car business, c) should have worked on quality rather than overseas expansion but the energy crisis, regulations and the recession were to blame.
  2. Government had regulated Chrysler into its current mess because the company was investing the bulk of its capital into meeting government regulations;
  3. The Chrysler bailout is not a new precedent since others had already occurred at a total of $406 billion dollars worth;
  4. Bankruptcy is not practical because it would likely lead to liquidation this is because the car servicing of Chrysler models would mean that re-sale values of models would drop, future warrantee coverage would lapse, orders would be cancelled so bankruptcy would be the end of Chrysler and was not a realistic alternative to a government bailout;
  5. Free-enterprise has adapted since the industrial revolution, it is flexible and organic and nobody is playing in a laissez-faire system;
  6. Competition would be weakened without Chrysler especially with Japanese manufacturers entering the US market, Chrysler could not build only small cars because the profit margin is too low at $700 each. Big gas guzzlers are like steaks and small cars are like hamburgers;
  7. The specific congressmen should know how a bankruptcy of Chrysler would effect their constituencies because 600,000 jobs were at stake and the unemployment rate was projected to sore costing unemployment insurance of $2.7 billion during the first year.

Chrysler won its bailout money in Congress with a 2 to 1 margin at 271 to 136. The Senate voted 53 to 44 for the bailout. So the loan guarantee was $1.5 billion. $400 million in new credit and $100 million in discounts on existing loans, and Chrysler had to sell $300 million in further assets. State and local governments had to provide $250 million, $50 million in new stock were issued, and non-union employees had to contribute $125 to pay cuts.

Chrysler was valued at $6 billion and at liquidation would be worth $2.5 billion in 1980 according to the US government.

This is a synopsis & analysis based on Iacocca: An Autobiography and other miscellaneous research sources. Enjoy.

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